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Abstract
The private car license plates issued in Shanghai are bestowed the title of “the most expensive sheet iron all over
the world”, more expensive than gold. A citizen has to bid in an monthly auction to obtain a license plate for his
new private car. We perform statistical analysis to investigate the influence of the minimal price Pmin of the bidding
winners, the quota Nquota of private car license plates, the number Nbidder of bidders, as well as two external shocks
including the legality debate of the auction in 2004 and the auction regime reform in January 2008 on the average price
Pmean of all bidding winners. It is found that the legality debate of the auction had marginal transient impact on the
average price in a short time period. In contrast, the change of the auction rules has significant permanent influence
on the average price, which reduces the price by about 3020 yuan Renminbi. It means that the average price exhibits
nonlinear behaviors with a regime change. The evolution of the average price is independent of the number Nbidder
of bidders in both regimes. In the early regime before January 2008, the average price Pmean was influenced only by
the minimal price Pmin in the preceding month with a positive correlation. In the current regime since January 2008,
the average price is positively correlated with the minimal price and the quota in the preceding month and negatively
correlated with the quota in the same month. We test the predictive power of the two models using 2-year and 3-year
moving windows and find that the latter outperforms the former. It seems that the auction market becomes more
efficient after the auction reform since the prediction error increases.
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1. Introduction
Gold, silver, platinum and palladium are precious metals, in which gold is also called hard currency. Precious
metals are certainly expensive. For instance, the price of gold (London Gold Fixing PM) was 810.50 USD per troy
ounce on 21 December 2007 and 1106.50 USD per troy ounce on 18 December 2009. The foreign exchange rates
between US dollar and Chinese Renminbi (RMB) were 7.3572 RMB/USD and 6.8284 RMB/USD on these two days.
Equivalently, the two prices are 194,933 RMB/kg and 246,997 RMB/kg. There is no doubt that gold or platinum
cannot be termed as the most expensive metal in the world since there exist metals that are more precious. For
most people, it is hard to tell what is the most previous metal in the world. Nevertheless, a large population of
Chinese people know about the existence of “the most expensive sheet iron all over the world” in Shanghai, which
is the nickname given to the private car license plate (PCLP) issued by the Vehicle Administrative Organ of the
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Traffic Administering Department of the Shanghai Municipal Public Security Bureau. The average auction price of
Shanghai’s PCLPs was 56,042 RMB on 22 December 2007 as the historical high since January 2000 and 37,593 RMB
on 19 December 2009. Since the weight of a license plate is about 0.19 kg, we find that the price of this “special”
metal was 294,958 RMB/kg on 22 December 2007 and 197,858 RMB/kg on 19 December 2009.
In Shanghai, a private car owner has to bid for a license plate in the monthly auction held by Shanghai International
Commodity Auction Co. Ltd. The PCLP auction started since 1986 in Shanghai in order to control the overly fast
growth of private cars and relieve the traffic congestion. At the time, the minimum bid price was posed to be 100,000
RMB and the actual price could be as high as 300,000 RMB. In early 1998, a special kind of license plates was
released and the minimum bid price reduced to 20,000 RMB, which can only be used for Santana 2000 cars made
by Shanghai Volkswagen and later Buicks produced by Shanghai GM. In contrast, the minimum bid price for not-
made-in-Shanghai cars remained unchanged. This caused a trade war between Shanghai and Hubei province. This
regional protectionism policy was abolished in January 2000 and the minimum bid price of auction was canceled as
well, which applied to domestic cars while a minimum bid price of about 50,000 RMB still applied to imported cars.
The minimum bid price for imported cars was canceled in March 2003, one year and a half after China became a
member of the World Trade Organization. Before 2008, the auction was blind and the bidders were allowed to submit
a price only once. Since January 2008, the policy changed with an open auction system taking into effect and the
bidders can revise their submitted bid price twice.
The legality of the private car license plate auction was questioned from time to time [1]. The debate attracted
most attention of the public happened in 2004 and culminated in May [2]. In April 2004, the Beijing Youth Daily
reported that the National Development and Reform Commission would stop Shanghai’s auction and the Focal Talk
Online of Xinhua Net questioned the high price of a license plate. On May 24, Mr. Hai Huang, the Assistant Minister
of the Ministry of Commerce of China, explicitly expressed that the PCLP auction violated the Law of the People’s
Republic of China on Road Traffic Safety that came into force on 1 May 2004. On the second day, the spokeswoman
of Shanghai Municipal Government replied that Shanghai would not change the practice of PCLP auction for the
moment. The majority of the domestic legal community argued that Shanghai’s PCLP auction is illegal [3–5], while
some others disagreed [6].
The function of the auction is more than what the officials claimed. From October 1998 to October 2001, there
was a policy of combined house-car sale with an extra bonus of a free PCLP. This is certainly not the only reason that
fueled the real estate bubble in Shanghai. However, it highlights the gestation of the on-going housing bubble [7].
A direct consequence of the PCLP auction is that a large proportion of the private car owners equip their cars with
license plate issued by other provinces, which not only denies the initial intent of the auction but also causes other
administrative problems. There is no clear scientific evidence showing whether the auction does improve the traffic
situation in Shanghai. More generally, there are only a few quantitative studies on the topic of PCLP auction. Lou
and Wang studied the vehicle license auction based on the private value bid model and found that the reform of the
auction in January would lower the minimal price of the winning bidders in a short period [8]. Alternatively, Xu tried
to predict the average price based on a simple linear regression model with a dummy variable [9]. Most studies focus
on the physical properties of complex road traffic based on numerical modeling and real data [10–15], which provide
insights into the understanding of traffic congestion and possible solutions to optimize traffic design.
In this work, we attempt to investigate the behavior of the monthly average price Pmean of the winning bidders
of private car license plates in Shanghai. In Section 2, we describe the data sets and their basic statistical properties.
Section 3 performs systematical analysis of different regressive models to understand what are the influencing factors
of the average price. In Section 4, we try to construct and select predictive models using moving windows, which
enables us to identify a change of regime occurred in January 2008. Section 5 summarizes.
2. Data sets
The data sets we analyze in this work are retrieved from the web site of Shanghai International Commodity
Auction Co. Ltd1. There are four variables, the average price Pmean of all bidding winners, the minimal price Pmin
of the bidding winners, the quota Nquota of private car license plates, and the number Nbidder of bidders. The data are
1http://www.alltobid.com/guopai/, accessed on 6 January 2010.
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monthly and cover the time period from January 2002 to December 2009. No auction occurred in February 2008.
Therefore, the length of each data set is 95. Table 1 depicts the basic statistics of the four variables.
Table 1: Basic statistics of the four variables.
Variable Minimum Median Maximum Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis
Pmean 14057 34842 56042 33950 8389 -0.099 3.249
Pmin 100 33800 53800 31938 9626 -0.555 3.692
Nquota 1400 5690 16000 5628 2060 1.140 8.257
Nbidder 3525 10170 110234 12846 12657 5.611 40.662
The evolution of the four variables is illustrated in Fig. 1. According to Fig. 1a, we observe three time periods
separated by two months, May 2004 and January 2008. In each of the first two periods, the average price has an
increasing trend. Since January 2008, there is no evident trend and the price becomes more stable. The minimal price
curve is on average close to the average price curve. However, we see three striking downward spikes occurred in
December 2002, May 2004 and January 2008. For the number of bidders, there is also a weak increasing trend with a
marked spike in October 2006 and a peak around March 2008. The monthly quota also increases with a strong yearly
periodic pattern. In each year except 2008, the quotas in the early months are low, which is caused by the fact that
the sale of private cars is low in these months. It is not clear how the Shanghai Municipal Government determines the
quota in each month.
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Figure 1: (Color online) Evolution of the average price Pmean of all bidding winners, the minimal price Pmin of the bidding winners, the quota
Nquota of private car license plates, and the number Nbidder of bidders.
Fig. 2a shows the scatter plot of the average price Pmean against the minimal price Pmin, in which all the data points
locate above the diagonal line Pmean = Pmin. A nice linear relationship is observed:
Pmean(t) = a0 + a1Pmin(t). (1)
An ordinary linear regression gives that a0 = 8813 ± 2570 and a1 = 0.787 ± 0.077, where the errors are determined
at the 95% confidence level. The R-square is 0.816. According to Ref. [16], six outliers are identified at the 5%
significance level including December 2002, September 2003, May 2004, August 2005, January 2008, and March
2008, three of which are indicated in Fig. 2a. We further perform a robust fit using iteratively re-weighted least
squares [17–19], and find that a0 = 1251 ± 332 and a1 = 0.988 ± 0.010 at the 95% confidence level. The two fits are
shown in Fig. 2a for comparison. In Fig. 2b, there is also a linear relationship between the two variables:
Nbidder(t) = b0 + b1Nquota(t). (2)
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The ordinary linear regression gives that b0 = 298 ± 7060 and b1 = 2.229 ± 1.179 with the R-square being 0.132.
At the 5% significance level, two outliers are identified in November 2006 and March 2008. In contrast, the robust
regression gives that b0 = 2463 ± 1325 and b1 = 1.488 ± 0.221. The positive correlation between Nbidder and Nquota
means that the number of bidders is strongly influenced by the quota in the same month, which is publicly announced
before the auction.
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Figure 2: (a) Positive correlation between the average price Pmean of all bidding winners and the minimal price Pmin of the bidding winners. (b)
Positive correlation between the quota Nquota of private car license plates and the number Nbidder of bidders.
3. Modeling the evolution of average price
3.1. Basic statistical analysis
In our analysis, we attempt to model the average price Pmean(t). The first explanatory variable is the minimal price
Pmin(t − 1) in the preceding month. Rationally, the supply Nquota and demand Nbidder of the PCLPs are expected to
have essential influence in the formation of the price. Before the auction in month t, the supplied quota Nquota(t) of
license plates is released by the Shanghai Municipal Government. However, the number of bidders Nbidder(t) is known
only after the auction finishes. Therefore, we add Nquota(t) and Nbidder(t − 1) as two explanatory variable. Since the
demand Nbidder(t − 1) in month t − 1 is included, we also add the supply Nquota(t − 1) in month t − 1 in the model. We
thus obtain the following model
Pmean(t) = c0 + c1Pmin(t − 1) + c2Nquota(t) + c3Nquota(t − 1) + c4Nbidder(t − 1) + ǫ(t), (3)
where ǫ(t) is the residual.
We calibrate the model (3) to all the data from January 2002 to December 2009. The estimates of the coefficients
are c0 = 8601, c1 = 0.814, c2 = −2.343, c3 = 2.243, and c4 = 0.025, respectively. The R-square is 0.81. Statistical
test shows that c0, c1, c2 and c3 are significantly different from zero with all the p-values equal to zero. In contrast,
the p-value of c4 is 0.44, showing that the influence of the bidder number in the previous month Nbidder(t − 1) on the
average price Pmean(t) is insignificant. Discarding the variable Nbidder from model (3), we have
Pmean(t) = c0 + c1Pmin(t − 1) + c2Nquota(t) + c3Nquota(t − 1) + ǫ(t). (4)
A linear least-squares regression gives that c0 = 8584, c1 = 0.814, c2 = −2.316, and c4 = 2.277. The R-square is
0.809. Statistical test shows that all the coefficients are significantly different from zero.
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Table 2 summarizes the results of model calibration. One can see that the corresponding estimates for the same
variable in the two models are very close to one another. In addition, introducing Nbidder in model (3) gives marginal
improvement in the explanatory power of the model since the value of R2 increases only slightly from 0.809 to 0.810.
Table 2: Calibration of Model (3) and Model (4). An estimate followed by “***” means that the variable is significant at the 0.001 level. An
estimate followed by “**” means that the variable is significant at the 0.01 level. An estimate followed by “*” means that the variable is significant
at the 0.1 level.
Model R2 c0 c1 c2 c3 c4
(3) 0.810 8601*** 0.814*** -2.343*** 2.243*** 0.025
(4) 0.809 8584*** 0.814*** -2.316*** 2.277*** /
3.2. Influence of exogenous shocks on the average price
We now take into account two exogenous shocks that might have influence on the average price. The first shock
is the debate on the legality of the auction in 2004. The ministry of Commerce of the central government argued that
the PCLP auction is illegal, which was supported by many law scholars. The controversy peaked in May 2004 and
many citizens in Shanghai supposed that the auction would be canceled soon. This expectation made the price drop
dramatically in May 2004, as shown in Fig. 1. The second exogenous shock is the change of the auction rules that
took into effect in January 2008, which also remarkably pulled down the price in January 2008. We thus introduce two
dummy variables, D2004 and D2008. When the time is earlier than May 2004, we set D2004 = 0; otherwise, D2004 = 1.
When the time is earlier than January 2008, we set D2008 = 0; otherwise, D2008 = 1. The model (3) becomes
Pmean(t) = c0 + c1Pmin(t − 1) + c2Nquota(t) + c3Nquota(t − 1) + c4Nbidder(t − 1) + d1D2004 + d2D2008 + ǫ(t), (5)
The dummy variable is used to explain the possible influence of the exogenous shocks on the average price. If the
coefficient d1 or d2 is statistically significant, we can conclude that the behavior of price formation changed owning
to the corresponding exogenous shock.
We calibrate the model (5) to all the data from January 2002 to December 2009. The estimates of the coefficients
are c0 = 7925, c1 = 0.780, c2 = −2.009, c3 = 2.423, c4 = 0.040, d1 = −771, and d2 = −3144. The R-square is 0.830.
Statistical test shows that c0, c1, c2 and c3 are significantly different from zero at the 0.1% level, while the p-values
are 0.206 for c4, 0.462 for d1, and 0.004 for d2. Again, the number of bidders in the preceding month has no impact
on the average price in the current month. In addition, the legality debate does not have permanent impact on the
price afterwards. It is reasonable since the Shanghai Municipal Government insisted that it was too early to abolish
the auction system, which was still an effective way to alleviate the heavy traffic.
We remove the two insignificant variables Nbidder and D2004 to construct a new model:
Pmean(t) = c0 + c1Pmin(t − 1) + c2Nquota(t) + c3Nquota(t − 1) + d2D2008 + ǫ(t). (6)
We find that c0 = 8144, c1 = 0.774, c2 = −2.007, c3 = 2.401, and d2 = −3020. The R-square is 0.826. The p-value
of d2 is 0.005. It is found that c0, c1, c2 and c3 are statistically significant at the 0.1% level, while d2 is significant at
the 1% level. Table 3 summarizes the results of model calibration. The change of auction rules has permanent impact
on the average price, which reduces the average price by 3020 RMB. The obvious reason is that the new auction
procedure is more transparent and the bidders can monitor the real-time evolution of the price and revise accordingly
their bid prices twice. In other word, the market is more efficient since January 2008.
4. Prediction of the average price
4.1. Models for prediction
The empirical analysis presented in Section 3 enables us to understand the dynamics of the average price. In order
to make predictions, we need to further study the performance of the proposed models. Rather than using all the data
available, it is rational to using the data in a fixed moving window of size S right before the month to be predicted. In
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Table 3: Calibration of Model (5) and Model (6). An estimate followed by “***” means that the variable is significant at the 0.001 level. An
estimate followed by “**” means that the variable is significant at the 0.01 level. An estimate followed by “*” means that the variable is significant
at the 0.1 level.
Model R2 c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 d1 d2
(5) 0.830 7925*** 0.780*** -2.009*** 2.423*** 0.040 -771 -3144**
(6) 0.826 8144*** 0.774*** -2.007*** 2.401*** / / -3020**
this vein, we calibrate a model using data from month t−S to month t−1 to obtain the estimates of model parameters,
and then extrapolate to predict the average price of month t. For this purpose, we have to investigate the “local”
descriptive power of the models, which might be different from the “global” results obtained in Section 3.
We consider two window sizes, S = 24 months and S = 36 months. This choice is more or less subjective but
not irrational. On the one hand, the window should not be too long, since earlier information is expected to have less
influence on the current average price. On the other hand, the window should not be too short, since the models will
otherwise be unstable. For the sake of completeness, we investigate model (5), which contains all the variables we
considered. In this way, we are able to determine which influencing factors are significant and how the collection of
influencing factors changed along time.
For each month t, we calibrate model (5) and obtain the p-values of the variables. For clarity, we use a quantitative
presentation of the results in Fig. 3. We divide the interval [0,1) into five subintervals [s1, s2): [0, 0.001), [0.001, 0.01),
[0.01, 0.05), [0.05, 0.1), and [0.1, 1). Consider that the p-value of a given variable is p at time t. If s1 6 p < s2, we
plot a symbol in the interval [s1, s2) in Fig. 3. For the dummy variable, there are windows that do not contain either
May 2004 or January 2008. In this case, neither of the two dummy variables are included in the regression and we plot
points in the bottom interval [−1, 0) in Fig. 3. It is necessary to point out that one dummy variable is included in the
model only when May 2004 or January 2008 is not the at the edge of the window. Otherwise, the model is singular.
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010−1
0
0.001
0.01
0.05
0.1
1
t
sig
ni
fic
an
ce
 le
ve
l
 
 
a
c0
Pmin(t− 1)
Nquota(t)
Nquota(t− 1)
Nbidder(t− 1)
D2004,D2008
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010−1
0
0.001
0.01
0.05
0.1
1
t
sig
ni
fic
an
ce
 le
ve
l
 
 
b
c0
Pmin(t− 1)
Nquota(t)
Nquota(t− 1)
Nbidder(t− 1)
D2004,D2008
Figure 3: (Color online) Evolving significance level of the influencing factors (or variables) for the moving window size S = 24 (a) and S = 36 (b).
There are five intervals of significant level: [0, 0.001), [0.001, 0.01), [0.01, 0.05), [0.05, 0.1), and [0.1, 1). The different locations of two points in a
given significance interval are not related to the difference in their p-values. The bottom interval [-1,0) is not for significance level but to indicate
that there is no dummy variable in the model for the associated window.
In general, the two plots in Fig. 3 are delivering very similar information. The results are summarized below for
each variable.
• Pmin(t − 1): When S = 24, the variable is significant at the 0.05 level for almost all months. In addition, the
variable is significant at the 0.001 level for most months in years from 2005 to 2008 and significant at the 0.01
level for most months in years 2004 and 2009. When S = 36, the variable is significant at the 0.001 level for all
months under investigation.
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• Nquota(t): Basically, the variable is significant at the 0.001 level after January 2008 and insignificant since the
p-values are greater than 0.1 before January 2008, which holds for both S = 24 and S = 36. For some of the
months where May 2004 is within the window, the p-values are less than 0.05.
• Nquota(t − 1): Similar to Nquota(t), the variable is significance at the 0.001 level after January 2008 and insignif-
icant with the p-values greater than 0.1 before January 2008, which holds for both S = 24 and S = 36 with a
few exceptional months.
• Nbidder(t − 1): When S = 36, the variable is insignificant at the 0.1 level for all months with two exceptions.
When S = 24, the variable is insignificant at the 0.1 level for all months in years from 2004 to 2008 with two
exceptions. In 2009, we observe weak influence of this variable on the average price Pmean(t) and the variable
is significant at the 0.05 level for six months.
• D2004: For this variable, we should focus on the “diamonds” in Fig. 3 before 2007. For both S = 24 and S = 36,
the variable is insignificant at the 0.1 level for all months with only a few exceptions.
• D2008: For this variable, we should focus on the “diamonds” in Fig. 3 after 2007. Roughly speaking, for both
S = 24 and S = 36, the variable is insignificant at the 0.1 level for the early months in 2008 and becomes
significant at the 0.05 level afterwards. It shows that the change of the auction rules does have influence on the
average price, which can be detected only when enough data points are included in the model.
According to these results, we should use different models for the data before and after January 2008. Before the
change of auction rules, the model should contain only Pmin(t − 1) and D2004. We can use the following
Pmean(t) = c0 + c1Pmin(t − 1) + d1D2004 + ǫ(t), (7)
which is the model adopted in Ref. [9]. Since the influence of the dummy variable D2004 is marginal, we should also
consider the following model for comparison:
Pmean(t) = c0 + c1Pmin(t − 1) + ǫ(t). (8)
Since January 2008, we should use model (6), as well as model (4) for comparison.
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Figure 4: (Color online) Evolution of the estimated coefficients: (a) c0 and c1, (b) c2 and c3. For better presentation, we plot 104c0 and 2c1 instead
of c0 and c1 .
Figure 4 shows the evolution of the estimated coefficients c0, c1, c2 and c3. It is found that the two evolutionary
curves for each coefficient are qualitatively the same. For all coefficients, we observe a change of regime around
January 2008. As shown in Fig. 4a, the coefficient c1 for the variable Pmin increases before January 2008 and decreases
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afterwards. In Fig. 4b, we find that c2 and c3 evolved in a very similar way before January 2008 and then experienced
a sudden change with a decrease in c2 and an increase in c3, which makes Fig. 4b look like a bifurcation diagram.
Therefore, the average price Pmean(t) is negatively related to the quota Nquota(t) in the same month as expected and
negatively related to the quota Nquota(t − 1) in the preceding month. In addition, we find that c2 ≈ c3 so that model (6)
can be rewritten as
Pmean(t) = c0 + c1Pmin(t − 1) − c3∆Nquota + d2D2008 + ǫ(t), (9)
where c3 > 0 and ∆Nquota = Nquota(t) − Nquota(t − 1) is the increment of quota compared with the preceding month.
This model (9) has a more clear economic interpretation than model (6) that the average price is expect to decrease if
more PCLP quota is released compared to that in the preceding month.
4.2. Prediction
Based on the results of Section 4.1, we can make out-of-sample prediction of the average prices. For comparison,
we use three predictive models: a mixed model of Eq. (6) and Eq. (7) with dummy variables, model (4), and model
(8). For each model, we obtain the estimates of the parameters and extrapolate to obtain the predicted average price
ˆPmean(t + 1) in the successive month. This is done for S = 24 and S = 36. Fig. 5 illustrates the difference between the
predicted price with reference to the true average price:
∆P(t) = ˆPmean(t) − Pmean(t). (10)
The most striking feature of Fig. 5 is that the predictions for the prices in January and March of 2008 completely fail.
Note that there was no auction in February 2008. We also find that the curves are more noisy after January 2008 than
before, which means that the auction became more efficient after it became more transparent. However, this claim
calls for more data since we observe a decreasing trend in ∆P(t).
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Figure 5: (Color online) Evolution of the difference between the predicted price with reference to the true average price: ∆P(t) = ˆPmean(t)−Pmean(t)
for the three models: a mixed model of Eq. (6) and Eq. (7) with dummy variables, model (4), and model (8).
Table 4 shows the averages of absolute prediction errors |∆P| for the three models and for different samples.
Several features can be extracted. First, the results are similar for S = 24 and S = 36. However, each value for
S = 24 is larger than the corresponding value for S = 36 implying that the prediction using a longer window S = 36
systematically outperforms that with a shorter window S = 24. Second, the values in column B1 are significantly
less than those in column B2, which is a quantitative description that the curves in Fig. 4 after January 2008 are more
noisy. Third, for sample B1, we find that model (4) has the worst predictive power for both S = 24 and S = 36, the
mixed model (or equivalently model (7)) outperforms model (8) when S = 24, and model (8) outperforms the mixed
model (or equivalently model (7)) when S = 36. Fourth, for sample B2, we find that model (4) has the best predictive
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performance for both S = 24 and S = 36. The introducing of the dummy variable D2008 deteriorates the predictions.
In summary, we can conclude that the simpler models (4) and (8) outperform models (6) and (7) for samples B2 and
B1, respectively. This is reminiscent of the conventional wisdom that the simpler is the better, which seems true in
prediction [20].
Table 4: Average of the absolute prediction errors |∆P| for the three models and for different samples. Sample A contains all months from January
2004 to December 2009 for S = 24 and from January 2005 to December 2009 for S = 36. Sample B contains all months in A but discarding
January 2008 and March 2008. Sample B1 contains the months in B before January 2008 and sample B2 contains the months in B after January
2008 so that B = B1 ∪ B2.
Model S = 24 S = 36A B B1 B2 A B B1 B2
(6) and (7) 3284 2643 2118 3842 3234 2629 2057 3608
(4) 3361 2722 2377 3510 3153 2545 2126 3264
(8) 3230 2750 2170 4076 3158 2528 1906 3596
5. Summary
We have conducted statistical analysis of the average prices Pmean of the license plates of private cars in Shanghai.
We consider three endogenous variables including the minimal price Pmin of the bidding winners, the quota Nquota of
private car license plates, and the number Nbidder of bidders, as well as two exogenous shocks known as the legality
debate of the auction in May 2004 and the auction regime reform in January 2008. The data sets cover the period from
January 2002 to December 2009. We found that the legality debate of the auction had marginal transient impact on
the average price in a short time period, while the change of the auction rules has significant influence on the average
price, which reduces the average price by about 3020 RMB. Therefore, the evolution of the average price entered a
new regime caused by the auction reform in January 2008.
The number Nbidder of bidders is found to have no influence on the average price in the whole time period. Before
January 2008, the average price Pmean was only influenced by the minimal price Pmin in the preceding month with
a positive correlation. The quotas in the nearest two months become additional significant influencing factors since
January 2008. It means that the government is able to manipulate the average price by controlling the quota of license
plate after the auction reform.
We compared the predictive power of several models using 2-year and 3-year moving windows. It is found that the
two models without dummy variables had better performance and the use of the 3-year moving window gave better
predictions on average. In addition, the average absolute prediction error in the second regime is about 1,358 RMB
higher than in the first regime. We figure that the auction market becomes more efficient thanks to the auction reform
in January 2008.
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